Oil price and production strategy
What each production path implies for oil prices, revenue and reserves
A decision room for scenario analysis: the price outlook for the next 24 months and to 2050, set beside the EIA outlook and the futures strip, and five production paths compared on price, Saudi exports, oil revenue, the fiscal balance against the IMF breakeven, market share, spare capacity and the net present value of reserves. Every assumption is visible, and every parameter can be moved.
- EIA outlook Sep 2026
- Brent $114.89 · 2026-09-22
- IMF fiscal breakeven $90.94 (2025)
What changed since the last outlook
The EIA outlook of Sep 2026 against Aug 2026, and Brent against a month earlier.
EIA Brent, 2027 average
74.00$/bbl
+4.50 · was 69.50
EIA world demand, 2027
104.98mb/d
+0.02 · was 104.96
EIA supply less demand, 2027
4.88mb/d
+0.11 · was 4.77
OPEC surplus capacity, next six months
0.02mb/d
unchanged
OECD commercial stocks, end of outlook
3,020mb
+115 · was 2,905
Brent, latest close
114.89$/bbl
+17.97 · was 96.92 · since 2026-08-21
Scenario analysis. The paths are modelled under the assumptions shown on this page. They are not forecasts, not investment advice, and not a statement of what any government, company or producer group intends or should do.
01 Near term
Brent over the next 24 months
The model’s monthly path under current policy, with the spread of a seeded Monte Carlo run around it. By default the path is anchored: its baseline is the EIA outlook, with the futures strip in the first months and today’s price fading in, and the model adds only the difference current policy makes against the production the outlook assumes, through OECD commercial stocks. The unanchored structural model is drawn beside it for comparison.
Brent: history, the model’s path and its benchmarks
US dollars a barrel, monthly means. The fan holds 50% and 80% of 300 simulated paths.
- Brent, monthly mean
- Model, current policy
- 80% of paths
- EIA outlook
- Futures (WTI + spread)
- Unanchored model
- IMF fiscal breakeven
The path starts from today’s price; the gap between it and the outlook closes over 6 months, an assumption that can be moved.
Sources: EIA (Short-Term Energy Outlook Sep 2026, spot prices), futures settlements as EIA publishes them (Bloomberg, LSEG), IMF breakeven via FRED. Model: Renewable Vision.
Brent, month to date
$112.96
Sep 2026
Model in Dec 2026
$99
80% of paths: 79–123
Model in Mar 2027
$83
80% of paths: 62–110
Model in Sep 2027
$64
80% of paths: 45–87
Model in Sep 2028
$55
80% of paths: 38–82
Chance the next 12 months average below the breakeven
69%
IMF fiscal breakeven $90.9 (2025)
OECD stocks against the five-year average
-2.8 days
The model beside the published outlooks
Brent at four points ahead: the model’s path and its 80% range, the EIA outlook, the futures strip, and the World Bank’s annual assumption for the year.
- Model
- EIA outlook
- Futures
- World Bank, year average
- Model, 80% of paths
The IMF’s April 2026 reference assumption is about $82 a barrel for 2026, and $110 in its adverse scenario.
Sources: EIA (Short-Term Energy Outlook Sep 2026, spot prices), futures settlements as EIA publishes them (Bloomberg, LSEG), IMF breakeven via FRED. Model: Renewable Vision.
02 Production paths
Five production paths, compared
Each path is a Saudi crude production target, month by month and then to 2050, with other OPEC+ members adjusting beside it. Output cannot exceed what the outlook’s Middle East capacity allows while the disruption lasts. Choose shocks, a demand scenario and any assumption; everything recomputes in the browser.
Current OPEC+ required production for Saudi Arabia: 10.478 mb/d (Oct 2026). Maximum sustainable capacity: 12.0 mb/d.
Default. The baseline is the EIA outlook, with the futures strip in the first months and the gap between today’s price and the outlook closing over 6 months. The model adds the difference each production path makes against the production the outlook assumes; a path equal to that assumption is the baseline exactly.
The next 24 months under each path
Monthly. Choose the measure; the highlighted path is drawn heavier.
- Hold current policy
- Gradual increases
- Accelerated increases
- Deeper cut
- Market-share push
Model: Renewable Vision, on the EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook (Sep 2026), published demand scenarios (IEA, OPEC, EIA), the IMF breakeven via FRED and the cost bands stated in the method.
Each path against current policy
Brent under each path (in its colour) against current policy (grey), monthly, with what the path implies in 2027 and over the long run.
Model: Renewable Vision, on the EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook (Sep 2026), published demand scenarios (IEA, OPEC, EIA), the IMF breakeven via FRED and the cost bands stated in the method.
To 2050
Annual, in constant 2025 dollars. The price follows the full-cycle cost of the marginal barrel outside OPEC+ plus a cohesion premium that falls as spare capacity rises. The near-term years come from the monthly model, and from its last month the gap to the long-run price closes month by month, so the two join without a step.
- Hold current policy
- Gradual increases
- Accelerated increases
- Deeper cut
- Market-share push
- Price in IEA Stated Policies (WEO 2025)
Model: Renewable Vision, on the EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook (Sep 2026), published demand scenarios (IEA, OPEC, EIA), the IMF breakeven via FRED and the cost bands stated in the method.
Every output, path by path
| Measure | Hold current policy | Gradual increases | Accelerated increases | Deeper cut | Market-share push |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Brent, 2027 ($/bbl) | 72.4 | 70.9 | 69.4 | 78.6 | 67.4 |
| Brent, 2027–2030 average ($/bbl) | 62.1 | 59.8 | 58.0 | 70.2 | 56.0 |
| Lowest annual Brent, 2027–2035 ($/bbl) | 55.8 | 52.3 | 49.7 | 63.5 | 47.1 |
| Brent, 2030 ($/bbl) | 61.7 | 60.0 | 58.7 | 67.3 | 57.4 |
| Brent, 2040 ($/bbl) | 61.4 | 61.2 | 61.0 | 62.2 | 60.6 |
| Brent, 2050 ($/bbl) | 59.3 | 59.1 | 59.1 | 59.9 | 59.0 |
| Saudi crude output, 2027 (mb/d) | 10.08 | 10.46 | 10.67 | 9.33 | 10.67 |
| Saudi crude available for export, 2027 (mb/d) | 9.75 | 10.13 | 10.34 | 9.00 | 10.34 |
| Saudi oil revenue, 2027 ($ bn) | 254 | 258 | 258 | 255 | 250 |
| Saudi oil revenue, 2027–2035 ($ bn) | 2,067 | 2,120 | 2,165 | 2,016 | 2,188 |
| Fiscal balance against the breakeven, 2027 ($ bn) | -49 | -45 | -45 | -49 | -52 |
| Fiscal balance, 2027–2030 average ($ bn) | -71 | -70 | -70 | -67 | -73 |
| Saudi share of world oil, 2027 (%) | 9.6 | 10.0 | 10.2 | 8.9 | 10.2 |
| Saudi share, 2030 (%) | 9.9 | 10.4 | 10.9 | 8.9 | 11.3 |
| Saudi share, 2040 (%) | 10.2 | 10.7 | 11.2 | 9.2 | 11.6 |
| Saudi spare capacity, 2027 (mb/d) | 1.92 | 1.54 | 1.33 | 2.67 | 1.33 |
| OPEC+ spare capacity, 2027 (mb/d) | 2.92 | 2.54 | 2.33 | 4.67 | 2.33 |
| Net present value of export revenue ($ bn) | 2,454 | 2,528 | 2,598 | 2,354 | 2,644 |
| US tight oil response, 2027 (mb/d) | -0.00 | -0.01 | -0.02 | 0.03 | -0.04 |
| Tight oil at the margin of the cost curve, 2030 (mb/d) | 4.01 | 3.00 | 2.23 | 7.38 | 1.44 |
| Saudi reserves left, 2050 (bn bbl) | 173 | 168 | 164 | 182 | 160 |
| Years below the breakeven, 2027–2035 (of 9) | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 |
03 Backtest
How the near-term model would have done
The near-term model run from five past vantage points on the EIA outlook of the time, with a calibration fitted only on the months before, against the Brent that followed. Four forecasts: the anchored path (the default), the unanchored structural model, no change, and the outlook itself, held at its last month past its end so that every forecast is scored on the same months. Saudi Arabia and OPEC+ produce what the outlook assumed. Mean absolute errors, in dollars a barrel, as they came out.
Predicted and realised Brent from five vantage points
US dollars a barrel, monthly means, 24 months from each vantage point.
- Brent, realised
- Anchored path (default)
- Unanchored model
- No change
- EIA outlook of the time
Sources: EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook archives, EIA spot and NYMEX futures histories. Model: Renewable Vision.
Across 120 months, the mean absolute error is $18.06 a barrel for the anchored path, $20.02 for the unanchored model, $18.73 for no change and $17.81 for the EIA outlook of the time.
Why the anchored path is the default: at the production the outlook assumes, it is the outlook itself (with the futures strip in the first months), so its level is as good as the outlook’s, and the structural model contributes only what it is built for, the difference a production path makes. That difference cannot be backtested, because the path not taken is never observed.
| Forecast | 1–3 months | 4–6 months | 7–12 months | 13–24 months | All | Months scored |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anchored path (default) | 10.29 | 16.06 | 17.70 | 20.69 | 18.06 | 120 |
| Unanchored model | 14.91 | 19.29 | 19.40 | 21.78 | 20.02 | 120 |
| No change | 11.86 | 17.54 | 17.12 | 21.55 | 18.73 | 120 |
| EIA outlook of the time | 8.86 | 15.47 | 17.70 | 20.69 | 17.81 | 120 |
04 Members’ explorer
For members: your own path, the frontier and Monte Carlo
Members set a Saudi path quarter by quarter, run up to 1,000 Monte Carlo draws on it, search the paths on the efficient frontier for the objectives and constraints they choose, and export every run as CSV.
Members only
Free membership opens the full dashboard
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05 Method
How the model works, and what it rests on
Transparent by design: each step is listed, each parameter shown with its basis, each source with its licence. The full method is in the documentation.
The inventory–price relation
Twelve-month change in ln(Brent) against the twelve-month change in OECD commercial stocks, in days of cover above or below the five-year average (2020 left out of the average). Monthly, Jan 2008 to Aug 2026.
- Slope
- -0.0465 per day of cover (Newey–West s.e. 0.0056, t -8.27)
- R²
- 0.53
- Months
- 224
- Monthly noise left unexplained
- 0.101
- Share of world stock changes seen in OECD stocks
- 0.32 (R² 0.31)
- Saudi share of Middle East surplus capacity
- 0.81
- Five-year average used ahead
- 2021–2025
- Other forms fitted
- 1-month changes: slope -0.0210, R² 0.153-month changes: slope -0.0353, R² 0.256-month changes: slope -0.0410, R² 0.36Level against the 36-month mean: slope -0.0491, R² 0.40
- OPEC surplus capacity added beside stocks
- coefficient -0.011, t -0.38: not used
Sources: EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook (OECD commercial stocks and consumption, vintages 2008–2026), EIA Brent spot. Fit: Renewable Vision.
- Near term, monthly for 24 months: the EIA outlook’s balance, moved by the Saudi path, other members’ adjustment and compliance, GDP, the shocks, the short-run demand response and the US tight-oil response six to nine months later.
- The difference in the balance accumulates in OECD commercial stocks (θ of it) and becomes days of cover against the five-year average. By default the price is anchored: the EIA outlook, with the futures strip in the first months and today’s price fading in, plus the calibrated slope times the change in days of cover the path causes against the production the outlook assumes. The unanchored model instead moves Brent from today’s level by the slope times the change in the deviation.
- Long term, annual to 2050: demand follows the chosen published scenario; outside OPEC+ a cost curve of seven supply bands sets the marginal barrel; the price is that barrel’s full-cycle cost plus a cohesion premium that falls as spare capacity rises.
- Saudi exports are crude output less domestic crude burn (JODI profile, falling to 2030); revenue is exports times the realised price; the fiscal balance compares revenue with what the IMF breakeven implies; the net present value discounts export revenue and counts the reserves left in 2050.
- Monte Carlo draws the elasticities, growth, the tight-oil response, compliance and price noise around the anchored path; the frontier search runs 168 paths and keeps those no other path beats on every objective.
The full method, every parameter and every source
Every assumption
The defaults, where each comes from, and the range it can be moved within. Calibrated values are re-estimated from the data on each build.
| Parameter | Value | Range | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| Income elasticity of oil demand | 0.500 | 0.200 to 0.900 | Literature |
| Demand trend beyond GDP (efficiency, electrification) | -0.60 | -2.00 to 1.00 | Assumption |
| Short-run price elasticity of demand | -0.0500 | -0.1000 to -0.0100 | Literature |
| World GDP growth against the IMF path | 0.00 | -3.00 to 2.00 | Assumption |
| US tight oil response to price, after 6–9 months | 0.200 | 0.000 to 0.600 | Literature |
| Compliance with OPEC+ group adjustments | 0.800 | 0.000 to 1.000 | Assumption |
| Share of world stock changes in OECD stocks | 0.316 | 0.200 to 1.000 | Calibrated |
| Weight on the futures strip in the baseline, months 1–4 (fading to zero by month 8) | 0.500 | 0.000 to 1.000 | Assumption |
| Months for the gap between today’s price and the outlook to close | 6 | 1 to 24 | Assumption |
| Price change per day of cover, over twelve months | -0.0465 | -0.1000 to 0.0000 | Calibrated |
| Positioning overlay, per standard deviation | 0.0200 | 0.0000 to 0.0500 | Assumption |
| Saudi maximum sustainable capacity | 12.00 | 10.00 to 13.00 | Published |
| Saudi capacity by 2030 | 12.00 | 10.00 to 13.50 | Assumption |
| Saudi share of Middle East surplus capacity | 0.811 | 0.300 to 1.000 | Calibrated |
| Saudi realised price against Brent | -1.00 | -5.00 to 3.00 | Assumption |
| Government share of oil export revenue | 0.800 | 0.500 to 1.000 | Assumption |
| IMF fiscal breakeven oil price | 90.94 | 50.00 to 120.00 | Published |
| Export volume the breakeven is set at | 9.60 | 7.00 to 12.00 | Assumption |
| Discount rate for the net present value | 0.0800 | 0.0200 to 0.1500 | Assumption |
| Upstream cost per barrel | 8.00 | 2.00 to 20.00 | Assumption |
| Cohesion premium with no spare capacity | 8 | 0 to 30 | Assumption |
| Spare capacity that shrinks the premium by 63% | 3.00 | 0.50 to 8.00 | Assumption |
| Steepness of the cost curve outside OPEC+ | 1.00 | 0.50 to 3.00 | Assumption |
| Spare capacity held by other OPEC+ members | 1.00 | 0.00 to 4.00 | Assumption |
| Share of the gap to the long-run price left each year | 0.600 | 0.000 to 0.950 | Assumption |
Sources
Hand-kept tables
OPEC+ required production by country and month, Aramco’s official selling prices, Saudi domestic crude burn, maximum sustainable capacity, reserves, the demand scenarios and the cost bands are kept as sourced tables, last reviewed 2026-09-24, and edited by administrators.
OPEC+ required production, Saudi Arabia
May 2026: 10.228
Jun 2026: 10.291
Jul 2026: 10.353
Aug 2026: 10.416
Sep 2026: 10.478
Oct 2026: 10.478
Arab Light to Asia against Oman/Dubai
Jul 2026: +9.50
Aug 2026: -1.50
Sep 2026: -2.00
Oct 2026: -2.00
Saudi maximum sustainable capacity
12.0
Saudi proven crude reserves, billion barrels
267.2
IMF fiscal breakeven oil price
2022: 87.97
2023: 94.91
2024: 98.36
2025: 90.94
What the model leaves out
No refinery, product or freight detail; no reaction function for OPEC+ (policy is the input, not an output); the long-run cost curve is a set of stated bands, not a field-by-field study; prices beyond 2028 are in constant dollars; the inventory–price relation is a historical association, not a law.
Scenario analysis. The paths are modelled under the assumptions shown on this page. They are not forecasts, not investment advice, and not a statement of what any government, company or producer group intends or should do.